Indicators of Risks to Media Pluralism

Media Audience Concentration

Result: High Risk

This indicator aims to assess the concentration of audience and readership across media platforms based on audience share. Concentration is measured by using the nationwide biggest 4 owners in the market. 

Why? 

This indicator shows a HIGH risk to media pluralism in Serbia due to high media audience concentration in the television, radio and online markets and a medium concentration in the print market.

TV: 54.8%

The TV market in Serbia is highly concentrated as the 4 major owners represent the audience share of 54.8%. The market leader is the Public Broadcasting Service with its two TV stations reaching 18.11% of the audience. Pink Media Group owned by Zeljko Mitrovic has an audience share of 16.87% with two of its TV, Pink and Vesti. Kopernikus Network has two major TV stations in Serbia - B92 and Prva TV, through which it reaches 11.88% of the audience. The audience share of Happy TV amounts to 7.94%. The company is associated with Predrag Rankovic, also known as Peconi.

*Concentration of the TV market is calculated based on the data available, but could potentially be higher, as not all TV stations audience shares run by named companies are calculated.

Radio: 45.4%

Radio market in Serbia is moderately concentrated with the four major owners reaching 45.4% of the audience. PBS with two radio stations (8.88%), Maxim Media with 4 radio stations (17.2%), S Media team with 4 radio stations (14.31%) and Play Radio owned by Kopernikus Network are the four major owners.
 
Print: 47.97%

Print market in Serbia is moderately concentrated as four major owners represent an audience share of 47.97%. The market leader is Boban Rajić with his company Media 026 which operates two daily newspapers Večernji Novosti and Politika (50% ownership) that have a combined audience share of 16.35%. Second comes the Swiss corporation Ringier which has an audience of 10.69% with its newspaper Blic. It is closely followed by Mondo with the print edition of Kurir with an audience share of 10.66%. Insajder Tim (Informer) has an audience share of 10.27%.

Online: 71.55%

Online market, in the segment of news portals, is highly concentrated. Mondo with three portals (Kurir.rs, Espresso.rs and Mondo.rs) and Ringier with Blic.rs are the leaders. They are followed by Nova.rs owned by the United Media group and Telegraf.rs owned by the Internet group. Leading portals are characterized by tabloid and clickbait style reporting. 

*Online media concentration was calculated based on weighted sums based on Gemius audience data. Potential concentration could be bigger as not all portals of the named companies are included in the risk assessment.    

LowMediumHigh
Audience Concentration in Television

Percentage: 54.8%

  • PBS Radio Television Serbia 18.11% (RTS 1: 17.07%, RTS2: 1.04%)
  • Pink Group 16.87% (Pink TV: 16.17%, Vesti 0.7%)
  • Kopernikus Network 11.88% (Prva: 9.48, B92 2.4%)
  • Happy TV 7.94%
 
If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share below 25%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share between 25% and 49%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share above 50%. 
Audience Concentration in Radio

Percentage: 45.4%

  • PBS Radio Television Serbia 8.88% (Radio Beograd 1: 4.7%, Radio 202 4.18%)
  • S Media 14.31% (Radio S1: 10.31%, Radio S2: 2.49%, Radio S3: 1.22%, Radio S4: 0.29%)
  • Maxim Media 17.2 % (Hit FM 9.95%, TDI Radio 1.56%, Lola Radio 0.9%, JAT FM 0.94, Karolina 3.85%)
  • Play Radio 5.01%
If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share below 25%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share between 25% and 49%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share above 50%. 
Audience Concentration in Print

Percentage: 47.97%

  • Media 026: Večernje Novosti (9.86%), Politika (6.49%) 16.35%
  • Ringier: Blic 10.69%
  • Mondo: Kurir 10.66%
  • Insajder Tim: Informer 10.27%
If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share below 25%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share between 25% and 49%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share above 50%.
Audience Concentration in Online
  • Mondo 31.93% (kurirs.rs: 18.20%, espresso.rs: 6.72%, mondo.rs: 7.01%)
  • Blic.rs 20.81%
  • Telegraf.rs 8.96%
  • Nova.rs 9.85%
If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share below 25%.If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share between 25% and 49%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share above 50%.

Radio Audience Measurement – IPSOS, March 2022-March 2023
Print Audience Measurement – IPSOS, March 2022-March 2023
Online Audience Measurement – Gemius, March 2023
TV Audience Measurement - Nielsen, March 2022-March 2023

Media Market Concentration

Result: No data

This indicator aims to assess the horizontal ownership concentration based on market share which illustrates the economic power of companies/ groups. Concentration is measured for each media sector by adding the market shares of the major owners in the sector. 

Result: No data

Although the Serbian Business Registers Agency provides financial information on revenues, no financial information is available on specific horizontal markets, such as television, online, print and radio, therefore ownership concentration in horizontal markets cannot be computed. In accordance with the MOM methodology if the country presents data on audience, but not on revenues/market share: the market share data is excluded from the analysis, i.e., the findings are based on the audience data alone and the revenue data are considered optional.

LOWMEDIUMHIGH
Media Market Concentration in Television (horizontal)
Percentage: not assessed    
If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share below 25%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share between 25% and 49%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share above 50%. 
Media Market Concentration in Radio (horizontal) 
Percentage: not assessed    
If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share below 25%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share between 25% and 49%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share above 50%. 
Media Market Concentration in Print (horizontal) 
Percentage: not assessed 
If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share below 25%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share between 25% and 49%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share above 50%. 
Media Market Concentration in Internet Content Providers
Percentage: not assessed 
If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share below 25%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share between 25% and 49%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share above 50%. 

 

Regulatory Safeguards: Media Ownership Concentration

Result: Medium Risk

This indicator assesses the existence and effective implementation of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific and/or competition law) against a high horizontal concentration ownership and/or control in the different media. 

Score: 14 out of 20 (70%)

Result: Regulatory safeguards to prevent media ownership concentration are in place, yet the implementation of those safeguards remains problematic. This indicator assesses MEDIUM risk to the regulations that safeguard Media Ownership Concentration.  

Why?

All media in Serbia are regulated by The Law on Public Information and Media. All information about the ownership of the media should be recorded and publicly available at Media Registry, an online database run by Serbian Business Registry Agency. Media, regardless of its type, are obliged to inform the Media register about every change in the ownership structure.

The difference is in authorities responsible to control their activities and in the register where their ownership data is stored. Radio and TV are electronic media, and they are under the specific regime of Lex specialis - The law on electronic media. Regulatory Body for Electronic Media (REM) – is the responsible regulatory authority for Television and Radio broadcasting. Print media are under the purview of the Ministry of Telecommunications and Information.

There is no law that specifically regulates internet portals as a separate form of media, but general legal provisions of the Law on Public Information and Media apply to the internet media.

LPIM regulates horizontal media concentration by restricting ownership and managerial rights, applying the criteria of circulation for print media (50%) and ratings for electronic media (35%). The Republic of Serbia also has a Law on Protection of Competition (LPC), which regulates this field in detail and applies to all natural and legal persons in the Republic of Serbia, including media owners.

The Ministry and the Regulatory Authority are in charge of overseeing concentration and monopoly in the media. However, looking at the structure of the media in Serbia, the threshold is set so high that it is practically impossible to exceed the current limit of 35% of total combined ratings, that is, 50% of total annual circulation, so this form of monitoring is mostly of little use, without any concrete effects and presents the biggest weakness of the current media legislation in Serbia.

Television    DescriptionYesNoNAMD
Does the media legislation contain specific thresholds or limits, based on objective criteria (e.g. number of licenses, audience share, circulation, distribution of share capital or voting rights, turnover/revenue) to prevent a high level of horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in this sector?    This question aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific) against a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the TELEVISION sector.   1
Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with the thresholds in the print sector and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media and/or competition authority)?    This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system for the regulation on audiovisual media concentration.      1
Does the law grant this body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds?    

The variable aims at assessing if the law is providing a due system of sanctions to sector-specific regulation, such as: 

- Refusal of additional licences; 

- Blocking of a merger or acquisition; 

- Obligation to allocate windows for third party programming; 

- Obligation to give up licences/activities in other media sectors;

- divestiture.

 0.5
Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used?    

This indicator aims to assess the effective implementation of sector-specific remedies against a high horizontal concentrationin the media and/or control in the television media.  

Low risk: the relevant authority effectively uses its sanctioning powers in all the relevant cases
Medium risk: the authority's powers are not always used in all the relevant 

 0.5
Total:3
PRINT - Max. score: 4   DescriptionYesNoNAMD
Does the media legislation contain specific thresholds or limits, based on objective criteria (e.g. number of licenses, audience share, circulation, distribution of share capital or voting rights, turnover/revenue) to prevent a high level of horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in this sector?    This question aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific) against a high horizontal concentration in the media and/or control in the PRINT sector.   1
Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with the thresholds in the print sector and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media and/or competition authority)?    This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system for the regulation on audiovisual media concentration.      1
Does the law grant this body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds?    

The variable aims at assessing if the law is providing a due system of sanctions to sector-specific regulation, such as: 

- Refusal of additional licences; 

- Blocking of a merger or acquisition; 

- Obligation to allocate windows for third party programming; 

- Obligation to give up licences/activities in other media sectors;

- divestiture. 

 0.5
Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used?    This indicator aims to assess the effective implementation of sector-specific remedies against a high horizontal concentrationin the media and/or control in the television media.     0.5
Total:3
Internet - Max. score: 4    DescriptionYesNoNAMD
Does the media legislation contain specific thresholds or limits, based on objective criteria (e.g. number of licenses, audience share, circulation, distribution of share capital or voting rights, turnover/revenue) to prevent a high level of horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in this sector?    This question aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific) against a high horizontal concentration in the media and/or control in the ONLINE sector.   0.5
Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with the thresholds in the print sector and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media and/or competition authority)?    This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system for the regulation on audiovisual media concentration.      0.5
Does the law grant this body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds?    

The variable aims at assessing if the law is providing a due system of sanctions to sector-specific regulation, such as: 

- Refusal of additional licences; 

- Blocking of a merger or acquisition; 

- Obligation to allocate windows for third party programming; 

- Obligation to give up licences/activities in other media sectors;

- divestiture.

 0.5
Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used?    This indicator aims to assess the effective implementation of sector-specific remedies against a high horizontal concentrationin the media and/or control in the television media.     0.5
Total:2.00
Media Mergers  DescriptionYesNoNAMD
Can a high level of horizontal of ownership and/or control in the media sector be prevented via merger control/competition rules that take into account the specificities of the media sector? 

This question aims to access the existence of regulatory safeguards (sector specific and/or competition law) against a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the media sector through merging operations: 

- By containing media-specific provision that impose stricter thresholds than in other sectors;

- The mandatory intervention of a media authority in merger and acquisition cases (for instance, the obligation for the competition authority to ask the advice of the media authority);

- The possibility to overrule the approval of a concentration by the communication authority for reasons of media pluralism (or public interest in general), that - even tough they do not contain media-specific provisions - do not exclude the media sector from their scope of application. 

   1
Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with the thresholds in the print sector and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media and/or competition authority)?    This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system.      1
Does the law grant this body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds?    

The variable aims at assessing if the law is providing a due system of sanctions to sector-specific regulation, such as: 

- Blocking of a merger or acquisition; 

- Obligation to allocate windows for third party programming; 

- Obligation to give up licences / activities in other media sectors;

- divestiture.

 0.5
Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used?    This indicator aims to assess the effective implementation of sector-specific remedies against a high horizontal concentrationin the media and/or control in the television media.     0.5
Total:3

Media Ownership Monitor Serbia 2023 - Legal Assessment

Cross-media Ownership Concentration

Result: High Risk

This indicator aims to assess the concentration of ownership across the different sectors – TV, print, audio, and any other relevant media – of the media industry. Cross-media concentration is measured by adding up the market shares of the Top 8 media companies. The results are not an indicator for economic strength in different media sectors but rather for the potential influence on public opinion when considering all media types.

Why? 

The top 8 owners in Serbia across all four media sectors have a market share of 92.55%. These are the Public Broadcaster-RTS (39.95%), Željko Mitrović’s Pink Media Group (22.15%), Mondo Inc. (8.41%), United Group (8.24%), Ringier Serbia (7.55%), Happy TV (4.98%), Saša Blagojević’s Alo Media System and Maxim Media Plus (2.56%) and state-owned Politika AD (1.73%). The total market with revenue data for 2022 amounted to USD 347.17 million where the above mentioned top 8 made USD 321.3 million. 

The top 8 owners without the Public Broadcaster have a market share of 90.56%. The market size without the public broadcasters amounts to USD 218.97 million, where the top 8 commercial actors make USD 198.3 million. These were Pink Media Group (35.12%), Mondo Inc (13.34%), United Group (13.06%), Ringier Serbia (11.97%), Happy TV (7.90%), Alo Media System+Maxim Media (4.06%), Insajder Tim (2.69%) and Medijska Mreža (2.42%). 

These owners and companies are active in Television, Print, online and Radio markets.

LOW (1)MEDIUM (2)HIGH (3)
3Percentage: 92.55%
If within one country the major 8 owners (Top8) have a market share below 50% across the different media sectors.  If within one country the major 8 owners (Top8) have an audience share between 50% and 69% across the different media sectors. If within one country the major 8 owners (Top8) have a market share above 70% across the different media sectors.

SOURCES:

Serbian Business Registers Agency

Regulatory Safeguards: Cross-media Ownership Concentration

Result: Medium Risk

This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific and/or competition law) against a high degree of cross-ownership between media types (press, TV, radio, internet). Given the diversity of thresholds or limits that exist among different countries with regard to ownership and/or control, 'high' should be assessed according to the standards of your country and in the light of the thresholds or limits imposed by domestic laws.

Why?

Score: 5 out of 8 (62.5%)

Cross-media concentration is regulated in a similar way as horizontal concentration, when sanctioning powers, threshold and authorities are concerned. These rules are written down in the Law on Public Information and Media. As the concentration thresholds are set too high the same problem is observed here, that it is practically impossible to reach concentration. Generally vertical concentration by one company is prohibited but the law allows ownership in another type of media or in distribution through an affiliated legal person. So today in Serbia one can observe a situation where the two biggest internet and cable providers (SBB and Telekom Srbija) are also owners of various cable TV stations. The regulation for concentration prevention exists but is not effectively enforced. Therefore, the risk to Cross-Media Ownership Concentration is rated as Medium.

CROSS-MEDIA OWNERSHIPDescriptionYesNoNAMD
5.1Does the media legislation contain specific thresholds, based on objective criteria, such as number of licences, audience share, circulation, distribution of share capital or voting rights, turnover/revenue, to prevent a high degree of cross-ownership between the different media?This indicator aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific and/or competition law) against a high degree of cross-ownership in different media sectors.1 
5.2Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with these thresholds and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media authority)This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system for the regulation on audiovisual media concentration.1 
5.3Does the law grant body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds?

The variable aims at assessing if the law is providing a due system of sanctions to sector-specific regulation, such as: 

  • Refusal of additional licences; Blocking of a merger or acquisition;
  • Obligation to allocate windows for third party programming;
  • Obligation to give up licences/activities in other media sectors;
  • Divestiture.
0.5 
5.4Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used?

The relevant authority never uses its sanctioning powers.

The question aims at assessing the effectiveness of the remedies provided by the regulation.

0.5
5.5Can a high degree of cross-ownership between different media be prevented via merger control/competition rules that take into account the specificities of the media sector?

For instance, cross-ownership can be prevented by comptetion law: 

- by the mandatory intervention of a media authority in M&A cases (for instance, the obligation for the competition authority to ask the advice of the media authority); 

- by the possibility to overrule the approval of a concentration by the competition authority for reasons of media pluralism (or Public interest in general);

0.5
5.6Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with these rules and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media and/or competition authority)This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system for the regulation against a high degree of cross-ownership in different media sectors via merger control/competition rules.0.5 
5.7Does the law grant body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds?

Examples sanctioning/enforcement powers and remedies: 

- blocking of a merger or acquisition;

- obligation to allocate windows for third party programming;

- must carryobligation to give up licences/activities in other media sectors ;

- divestiture.

0.5
5.8Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used?The question aims at assessing the effectiveness of the remedies of the regulation.0.5 
Total                5

 

 

Media Ownership Monitor Serbia 2023 - Legal Assessment

Ownership Transparency

Result: Medium Risk

This indicator assesses the transparency of data about the political affiliations of media owners as ownership transparency is a crucial precondition to enforce media pluralism.  

Why?

Our sample includes 10 Television outlets, 9 Radio, 13 Print editions and 11 Online outlets, in total 43 media outlets. In 83% of cases Data was Publicly available, i.e. traceable in public records. 11.6% of outlets were Actively Transparent and in 5.4% of cases ownership was not transparent – Data was deemed Unavailable.
For the majority – 36 - of the media outlets and related companies, ownership data was at least publicly available at the Serbian Business Registers Agency.
5 media outlets were rated as actively transparent, majority of which belong to the PBS, which is legally obliged to inform the public proactively and comprehensively about its ownership. 2 outlets were rated as data unavailable – owners have publicly stated ownership of the outlets but it is not reflected in the public records.

No company actively disguised the ownership structure, e. g. through bogus companies.

LOW (1)MEDIUM (2)HIGH (3)
TRANSPARENCY
6.1

How would you assess the transparency and accessibility of data about media ownership?

Data on media owners as well as their political affiliations is publicly available and transparent.

(Active Transparency)

Code if that applies to > 75% of the sample

Data of media owners and their political affiliations are disclosed based on investigations of journalists and media activists or upon request.

(Passive Transparency, Publicly Available)

Code if that applies > 50% of the sample. 

Data on political affiliations of media owners are not easily accessible by the public and investigative journalists of activists are not successful in disclosing these data.

(Data Unavailable, Active Disguise)

Code if data is available for < 50% of the sample 

Regulatory Safeguards: Ownership Transparency

Result: Medium Risk

This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of transparency and disclosure provisions with regard to media ownership and/or control.

Why?

Score: 3 out of 5 = 60%

Under the Law on Public Information and Media, the media are obliged to provide on their website or in their print edition information on their publisher. Media are also obliged to report the ownership structure and editor-in-chiefs to the Media Register of the Serbian Business Registry. The same Register also requires the media to report, within 15 days, each change of the ownership/editor structure. Under the law, failure to do so is an offense.

Transparency ProvisionsDescriptionYes +No -NAMD
7.1Does national (media, company, tax...) law contain transparency and disclosure provisions obliging media companies to publish their ownership structures on their website or in records/documents that are accessible to the public?The aim of the question is to check regulatory safeguard for transparency towards the citizens, the users and the public in general.0.5
7.2Does national (media, company, tax...) law contain transparency and disclosure provisions obliging media companies to report (changes in) ownership structures to public authorities (such as the media authority)?The aim of the question is to check regulatory safeguard for accountability and transparency towards public authorities.0.5
7.3Is there an obligation by national law to disclose relevant information after every change in ownership structure?This question aims at assessing if the law provides rules on the public availability of accurate and up-to-date data on media ownership. This is a condition for an effective transparency.1
7.4Are there any sanctions in case of non-respect of disclosure obligations?This question aims at assessing if the law on media ownership transparency can be enforced through the application of sanctions.0.5
7.5Do the obligations ensure that the public knows which legal or natural person effectively owns or controls the media company?This question aim at assessing the effectiveness of the laws that deal with media ownership transparency and if they succeed in disclosing the real owners of the media outlets.0.5
Total (Mean of L-e und L-I sub-indicators)           3 out of 5

Media Ownership Monitor Serbia 2023 - Legal Assessment

Political Control Over Media Outlets

Result: High Risk

This indicator assesses the risk of political affiliations and control over editorial independence of newsrooms. It also assesses the level of interference by politically affiliated actors in the work of news media.

Why?

TV 55,77%

Owners of 8 out of 10 TV stations in our research have known political ties to the ruling party or the party affiliation is evident in their reporting and editorial guidelines.

  • RTS, with its two main channels, often fails to critically report on the burning social issues, actively avoiding topics that might be perceived as controversial, including high-level corruption, rule of law or human rights. Government and the ruling party indirectly interferes, through the Regulatory Body for Electronic Media (REM), with appointment of PBS Director and Managing Board.
  • Pink Group, with TV Pink and Vesti, is owned by Željko Mitrović who has public political ties to the authoritarian ruling regime of the 1990s, Slobodan Milosevic and Mirjana Markovic. Ever since then, he kept close ties with all the governments that formed since then. Propagandistic reporting in favor of the ruling SNS party is evident in the main news TV shows of these two TV stations, and sometimes, their programming is used to publicly attack opposition, independent media or any critics of the Aleksandar Vučić regime.
  • Prva TV and B92, are owned by Srđan Milovanović, who is the brother of Zvezdan Milovanović, a SNS representative for the city of Niš.
  • Happy TV is owned by Predrag Ranković Peconi, although this ownership tie is marked as active disguise by MOM methodology. The media report on his ties to the criminal clans and various governments ever since the 1990s.
  • Kurir TV, a cable TV station owned by Mondo and Igor Žeželj, is a supporter of a ruling party. This TV station is often used for propaganda purposes and smear campaigns against the critics of the government.

Radio 45,38%

8 out of 9 radio stations sampled in MOM research have owners with known political affiliations.

  • These include two radio stations of PBS (Radio Beograd 1 and Radio 202), Radio Pink which is owned by Željko Mitrović and Radio Play, part of the Kopernikus group and Srđan Milovanović. Political affiliations of named companies described above.
  • S Media Group (Radio S1 and S2, S3 and S4) is owned by the children of Zoran Anđelković, a high-ranked member of the Socialists Party (also a ruling party, in coalition with the SNS).
  • Hit FM is owned by the Krdžić Family, who gained the most public attention during the privatization of Studio B, a TV station covering the Belgrade area. After the privatization, Studio B drastically changed its editorial policy, clearly cheering for Vučić and his SNS party. Ever since, the Krdžić family has been growing its media business, including having the joint company with Saša Blagojević, owner of tabloid Alo! (Radio Studio B (0.27%), Jat (0.95%), Lola (1.78%, Novi Sad 0.97%), TDI (1.65%),  
  • AS FM from Novi Sad is owned by Aleksandar Đurić, who is the brother of the mayor of Novi Sad, a member of the ruling SNS party. 

Print 50%

8 out of 13 newspapers in our sample are owned/controlled by individuals with known political affiliations.

  • Insajder Tim (Informer) owned by Dragan Vučićević is a big supporter of the ruling party and his outlets provide a platform for direct attacks and smear campaigns on any critical voices.
  • Similar to Informer, editorial policy in Srpski Telegraf, owned by Medijska Mreza (owned by a group of people) suggests close political affiliation as the paper regularly attacks voices from the opposition and critics of the government.
  • Ownership of Pečat, leads to Milorad Vučelić, who was once a high- ranked member of the Socialists Party, and now close to the ruling SNS. Editorial policy of this weekly indicates close affinity to the ruling elite. Aleksandar Vulin, former editor of Pečat, is close to the president of Serbian Progressive Party, Aleksandar Vučić and has so far held several important ministerial positions, as well as the position of director of the security agency.
  • The owner of weekly Ekspres is Goran Veselinović who has close and friendly ties to the Serbian President,  Aleksandar Vučić. Veselinović also owns a PR agency ‘Right’ which had taken over the most of the marketing businesses in Serbia since 2012 when Vučić's SNS party came to power.
  • Politika and Večernje novosti are among the last media outlets to be privatized in Serbia. Both are owned (or partially owned) by Boban Rajić, who has known ties to the ruling SNS party.
  • Alo! is a tabloid known for its pro-government editorial policies. It is owned by Saša Blagojević, who is close to the ruling party.
  • Kurir, owned by Igor Žežrelj's Mondo Inc., explained above.

Online 64.21%

8 out of 11 online media in our sample have owners, or are controlled by the individuals with known political affiliations.

  • Kurir.rs, espresso.rs and mondo.rs are all part of a Mondo company, run by Igor Žeželj. These are some of the most visited websites in the country, often used to spread propaganda in the favor of the ruling party.
  • Novosti.rs and alo.rs, owned and co-owned by Boban Rajić's Media 026, explained above
  • 24sedam.rs, Telegraf.rs and Srbijadanas.com are portals owned by people who have known business ties leading to the ruling party. All editorial policies are pro-government.

The Law on Public Information and Media strictly prohibits any type of interference with the editorial autonomy or pluralism and guarantees editorial independence. Serbian Journalists Code of Ethics reinforces these provisions. In reality, however, the majority of mainstream media are politically affiliated, mostly due to the business interests of the owners. Editorial policies of these media, as demonstrated by the academic or watchdog organizations, are pro-government and in favor of the ruling party. In some cases, they are used as a platform to attack political opponents. Additionally, pro-government media are heavily supported through allocation of state funds, advertising contracts or grants through a project based state aid mechanism.

LOW (1)MEDIUM (2)HIGH (3)
POLITICISATION OF MEDIA OUTLETS
8.1

What is the share of TV media owned by politically affiliated entities?

The media having <30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician, or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation.The media having <50% >30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician, or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. The media having >50% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician, or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation.
8.2

What is the share of Radio stations owned by politically affiliated entities?

The media having <30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation.The media having <50%>30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician, or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. The media having >50% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation.
8.3What is the share of Newspapers owned by politically affiliated entities? MD
The media having <30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation.The media having <50%>30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. The media having >50% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation.
8.4What is the share of Online News Media owned by politically affiliated entities?
The media having <30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician, or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation.The media having <50%>30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician, or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. The media having >50% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician, or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. 
8.5To what degree is politically affiliated ownership transparent?
There is only limited politically affiliated ownership in the country and in all cases, the owners and their interests are disclosed to the public.The majority of politically controlled news media are transparent about their ownership and interests.The majority of politically controlled media are secretive about their ownership and interests.
8.6Are there laws that regulate conflicts of interests between media ownership and political parties, partisan groups, party members, office holders and relatives?
There is clear and effective regulation that highlights the incompatibility of political office (on the local, regional, national level) with media ownership and requires transparency in the case of other political offices.There is regulation, but only covers some politically affiliated groups (effectively).There is no regulation, or regulation is ineffective.
8.7Do politically partisan owners or other political interest systematically interfere with the editorial autonomy of newsrooms?
The available evidence suggests very few or no attempts at interfering with editorial autonomy.The available evidence suggests occasional interferences and/or some degree of self-censorship in newsrooms. The available evidence suggests systemic interference with editorial autonomy, which may or may not be accompanied by self-censorship in newsrooms. 
8.8To what extent is editorial independence guaranteed in editorial statutes or in self-regulatory mechanisms?
Most news media in the country guarantee editorial independence in their statutes, or they subscribe to self-regulatory codes that do so.The most prestigious news media in the country guarantee editorial independence in their statutes, or they subscribe to self-regulatory codes that do so.Neither editorial statutes, nor self-regulation mentions editorial independence, or the guidelines are not respected by newsrooms.

Political Control Over Infrastructure

Result: Medium Risk

This indicator assesses the political control over important infrastructural layers in the distribution, as well as in the value and supply chains of media content. It also assesses the level of discrimination in favour of politically affiliated media distribution networks. Infrastructural elements are in most cases privately owned and access is provided to news publishers for a fee.

Why?

  • Leading distribution networks for print media in Serbia include kiosks where newspapers are sold, as well as the printing houses. As data of the NielsenIQ for 2023 show, there are 3600 kiosks around the country, and some 32% of the people who shop at kiosks buy newspapers and magazines. The leader in the kiosk business is Moj kiosk, a brand owned by Štampa sistem, followed by Intermezzo System and Corner Kiosk. There has been no public records of discriminatory actions against the media by these companies or their political affiliations.  There are five major printing houses in the country - Politika, Borba, Ringier, Color Press, Grafoprodukt. Unlike kiosks, there has been a public record of discrimination in the field of printing houses. As United Media publicly announced in April 2021 each of the mentioned companies above refused to print Nova newspapers, which is the newest addition to the print market.
  • Radio is not the main medium when it comes to political or news reporting. For years, radio is more focused on music, while the daily news are generally broadcasted once in every hour as short bulletins. Radio frequencies are distributed according to the Law on Electronic communications and the radio frequency allocation plan (some 300 radio stations are registered at the moment). RATEL is the independent body in charge of RF spectrum allocation and its management, including its control. There has been no evidence of discrimination of radio stations in terms of access to the RF spectrum
  • There is an effective duopoly in TV channels distribution, especially via cable. Official data provided by RATEL in its quarterly reports, show that in Q3 of 2023 majority of people access to TV content via cable (48%), IPTV (31,5) and DHTV (14,7%). State owned Telekom Srbija holds 53% of the cable distribution  market, per share of users, followed by SBB which holds 40% of the market. Users who opt for one or another provider will have access to different TV channels. While SBB users will have access to United Media channels (including N1, Nova S, Sport klub and others), Telekom users will not have access to those, but rather channels supported by this company (e.g. Euronews, Bloomberg Adria, Arena sports).   
  • Besides being the biggest cable operators, the same companies are dominant when it comes to internet distribution. The same RATEL report quoted above shows that cable TV distribution is sold in a package with internet (and sometimes mobile phone) services.
  • Advertising market has been highly politicized for years. As BIRN reported in 2014, the ruling SNS took over the advertising market, through high-ranking party official Goran Veselinović, suppressing the democrats who sovereignly ruled this market through the Direct Media run by Dragan Đilas, once mayor of Belgrade and member of Democratic party. The situation hasn't changed since, and independent media report discriminatory practices and denial of advertising contracts.
  • The market of audience measurement services is rather limited. The leading agencies include Nielsen which provides TV audience measurements, IPSOS that provides data for radio and print and Gemius that provides online measurements service. Gemius is the only free service, while Nielsen and IPSOS charge for their services, which local media usually find too expensive to afford. There was no publicly available evidence on political affiliations of owners of named companies, however, lack of competition at the market raises questions about the quality of data.     
LOW (1)MEDIUM (2)HIGH (3)
POLITICISATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE
9.1How would you assess the conduct of the leading distribution networks for print media?
Leading distribution networks are not politically affiliated or do not take discriminatory actions.At least one of the leading distribution networks is politically affiliated or takes occasional discriminatory actions.All of the leading distribution networks are politically affiliated and has a record of repeated discriminatory actions.
9.2How would you assess the conduct of the leading radio distribution networks? NA
Leading distribution networks are not politically affiliated or do not take discriminatory actions.At least one of the leading distribution networks is politically affiliated or takes occasional discriminatory actions.All of the leading distribution networks are politically affiliated and has a record of repeated discriminatory actions.
9.3How would you assess the conduct of the leading television distribution networks? 
Leading distribution networks are not politically affiliated or do not take discriminatory actions.At least one of the leading distribution networks is politically affiliated or takes occasional discriminatory actions. All of the leading distribution networks are politically affiliated and has a record of repeated discriminatory actions. 
9.4How would you assess the conduct of the leading internet distribution networks?
Leading distribution networks are not politically affiliated or do not take discriminatory actions.At least one of the leading distribution networks is politically affiliated or takes occasional discriminatory actions.All of the leading distribution networks are politically affiliated and has a record of repeated discriminatory actions.
9.5How would you assess the conduct of the leading service providers in the advertising market?
There is no indication that major commercial advertising agencies / sales houses would discriminate against independent media.At least one of the leading commercial advertising agencies / sales houses discriminates against independent media due to political affiliations (despite having a significant audience share).Independent news media don’t have access to commercial advertising agencies / sales houses discriminating against independent media due to political affiliations (despite having a significant audience share).
9.6How would you assess the conduct of the leading audience measurement services?
Audience measurement services are in practice available to all relevant market players and comply with industry standards; transparency, non-discrimination, proportionality, objectivity and inclusiveness of the methodology and the service is guaranteed.At least one of the leading audience measurement services raises concerns related to transparency, non-discrimination, proportionality, objectivity, and/or inclusiveness. All of the leading audience measurement services raise concerns related to transparency, non-discrimination, proportionality, objectivity, and/or inclusiveness.

State Control Over Media Resources

Result: High Risk

This indicator assesses the influence of the state on the functioning of the media market, through control over public funds and resources, with an emphasis on the risk of discrimination in the distribution of state support and advertisement. The discrimination can be reflected in favouritism towards political parties or affiliates of political parties in the government, or in penalising the media criticising the government.

Why?

There is no official, centralised or fully public data on allocation of state advertising budget, making it one of the least transparent aspects of the Serbian media market. Part of the data on state advertising is available at the Public Procurements portal, but this database includes only advertising contracts that were carried out through the public procurement process and are above 1 Mln RSD (or approximately 9344 USD).  

Direct state subsidies are allocated through a so-called project co-financing mechanism. The state money is allocated by the national, regional and local governments for the content production projects. The mechanism is prescribed by the Law on Public Information and Media. As BIRN research shows, some 15 Mln USD is spent annually through this mechanism. Our research also demonstrates that pro-government media are the biggest beneficiaries of this type of support and that tabloid media, despite numerous breaches of the ethical code, are regularly financed.

Indirect state subsidies are rarely applied to the media sector. The most publicly known case of tax exemptions is applied to Pink Media Group, which was at some point one of the biggest tax debtors in the country. The same company received a loan for expansion of its operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is believed that political ties of Pink owner, Željko Mitrović, enabled these transactions. Rules under which media can be granted indirect state support remain unclear, non-transparent and not fairly distributed.        

There are two PSMs in Serbia - RTS which has national coverage and RTV which has coverage for the province of Vojvodina. Both are formally owned by Serbian citizens, however, the state has direct influence of its Managing Board through the selection process. Additional influence is exercised through direct budgetary funding enabled through lex specialis (PBS additionally has incomes through taxes paid by all Serbian citizens with electricity bill). 

LOW (1)MEDIUM (2)HIGH (3)
10.1Is state advertising distributed to media proportionately to their audience share? 
State advertising is distributed to the media relatively proportionately to the audience shares of media.State advertising is distributed disproportionately (in terms of audience share) to the media. State advertising is distributed exclusively to few media outlets, which do not cover all major media outlets in the country.
10.2How would you assess the rules of distribution of state advertising?
State advertising is distributed to media outlets based on fair and transparent rules.State advertising is distributed to media outlets based on a set of rules but it is unclear whether they are fair and transparent.There are no rules regarding distribution of state advertising to media outlets or these are not transparent and/or fair.
IMPORTANCE OF STATE ADVERTISING
10.3

What is the share of state advertising as part of the overall Radio advertising market?

VALUE: Missing data 

Share of state advertising is <5% of the overall marketShare of state advertising is 5%-10% of the overall marketShare of state advertising is > 10% of the overall market
10.4

What is the share of state advertising as part of the overall Radio advertising market?

VALUE: Missing data

Share of state advertising is <5% of the overall market.Share of state advertising is 5%-10% of the overall market.Share of state advertising is > 10% of the overall market.
10.5

What is the share of state advertising as part of the overall Newspaper advertising market?

VALUE: Missing data

Share of state advertising is <5% of the overall market.Share of state advertising is 5%-10% of the overall market.Share of state advertising is > 10% of the overall market.
10.6

What is the share of state advertising as part of the overall Online news media advertising market (without amounts spent on news intermediaries)?

VALUE: Missing data

Share of state advertising is <5% of the overall market.Share of state advertising is 5%-10% of the overall market.Share of state advertising is > 10% of the overall market.
10.7Is direct financial support distributed fairly, transparently and based on clear rules? NA
There are clear rules on the allocation of direct state subsidies and, in practice, subsidies are transparently and fairly allocated (criteria may not only be based on market share, but also public interest content, underserved communities, the need for innovation, etc.)The rules on the allocation of direct state subsidies are either not clear or the process of allocation lacks sufficient transparency or shows signs of political bias.There are no rules on the allocation of direct state subsidies and/or the allocation of subsidies is opaque and/or clearly discriminatory.
10.8Is indirect financial support distributed fairly, transparently and based on clear rules?
There are clear rules on the allocation of indirect state subsidies and, in practice, access to indirect subsidies is transparent and fair.The rules on the allocation of indirect state subsidies are either not clear or the process of allocation lacks sufficient transparency or shows signs of political bias.There are no rules on the allocation of indirect state subsidies and/or the allocation of indirect subsidies is opaque and/or clearly discriminatory.
10.9

Do all media outlets have access to the state-financed news agency, and do they receive quality content relevant for their news production?

Not applicable

There is a state-financed news agency in the country that is accessible to all news media under the same (and fair) conditions, providing objective, well-sourced information.There are some concerns related to access to the state financed news agency or possible bias in the content provided.Access to the state-owned news agency causes unnecessary burden for some news media and/or its content is biased.
10.10Do you consider the financing of the PSM independent and adequate?
The financing of the PSM is adequate, without distorting competition with private media; and the process includes sufficient guarantees against political dependencies (e.g. through licence fees)?The financing of the PSM is insufficient or could distort competition with private media; and the funding process may enable political dependencies?The financing is insufficient to a degree that quality journalism is not or hardly possible and/or the funding process is clearly under political control.
10.11How do you assess the independence of the appointment and dismissal process of the PSM management?
There are clear rules on the appointment and dismissal of the PSM management, independence from political actors is guaranteed; and in practice appointments and dismissal decisions are made based on professional considerations.Appointment and dismissal rules of PSM management may allow for some political influence and/or the practice of appointments and dismissals shows signs of bias.Rules on appointment and dismissal of PSM management clearly enable political influence and/or appointments and/or dismissals are clearly politically motivated.

Regulatory Safeguards: Net Neutrality

Result: Low Risk

Network neutrality is the principle that all data on networks should be treated equally by not discriminating or charging differently in terms of users, content, sites or applications. Protecting net neutrality is essential to safeguarding media diversity because it guarantees equal ability to access and disseminate information, opinions, perspectives, etc. online, which is essential to media diversity. This indicator aims to capture the landscape of legal regulation of net neutrality as well as the specific regulatory mechanisms that address net neutrality.

Why?

Serbia is recognized as a country that has a satisfactory level of freedom of the internet, with high levels of internet access and limited website blocking. So far, there have been no recorded cases of deliberate prohibited or blocked media content.

The general regulation that indirectly proclaims net neutrality in the Republic of Serbia is the Law on Electronic Communications. This particular law provides a definition of the internet as a global electronic communication system composed of a large number of interconnected electronic communication networks and devices that exchange data using a common set of communication protocols.

Among other things, this law regulates the conditions for conducting activities in the field of electronic communications, as well as the competencies of the Regulatory Agency for Electronic Communications and Postal Services (RATEL), which is monitoring the electronic communication market, including the competition rules for operators with significant market power.

The law also addresses issues related to the use and control of the radio frequency spectrum, the distribution of media content, the protection of end-user rights, the security and integrity of electronic communication networks and services, as well as oversight of the implementation of this law.

However,as the 2023 Freedom on the Net report notes, mobile operators in Serbia do engage in zero-rating, the provision of access to certain sites and services at no cost. All mobile service providers, including Yettel, A1 Serbia and Telekom Serbia continued to offer packages that included data for certain apps, such as Facebook, Viber, and WhatsApp.

Regulatory Safeguards Score 8.5 out of 11 (77%)

NET NEUTRALITYDescriptionYesNoNAMD
Does national law address net neutrality directly or indirectly?neutrality is regulated by domestic law in any way; it also aims to reflect any agreement between countries, as in the EU and countries that are part of the Council of Europe.1
Does national law contain norms that prohibit blocking of websites or content online?This question determines the degree to which a country’s net neutrality norms prevent blocking, one of the key components of a robust net neutrality framework1
Does national law contain norms that prohibit throttling of services or content provided online?This question determines the degree to which a country’s net neutrality norms prevent throttling, one of the key components of a robust net neutrality framework1
Does national law contain norms that prohibit zero-rating and/or paid prioritization?This question determines the degree to which a country’s net neutrality norms prevent zero-rating (of which paid prioritization is a common form), one of the key components of a robust net neutrality framework0.5
Where net neutrality is protected by law, does the legal framework recognize any exceptions, e.g. for reasonable network management?This question establishes when reasonable limits are placed on net neutrality protections versus other limits that may undermine its effectiveness.0
Norms that prohibit or limit zero-rating are successfully implemented: Paid prioritization does not take place.This question aims to flesh out the extent to which paid prioritization occurs in practice despite its prohibition in law; a number of countries with ostensibly strong zero-rating protections experience this phenomenon. This indicator may shed light on the degree of difference between law and practices on the ground1
Norms that prohibit or limit zero-rating are successfully implemented: No other forms of zero-rating take place.Same as above0
Norms are successfully implemented: Blocking and/or throttling do not take place.This question seeks to determine how the legal framework in place to protect net neutrality operates in practice with respect to blocking and throttling 0
Are there regulatory or other entities charged with monitoring and enforcing net neutrality protections?This question highlights whether there are authorities charged with enforcing net neutrality protections 1
Have sanctions been imposed for violations of net neutrality protections where these exist?This question may illustrate the extent to which violations of net neutrality norms are taken seriously as a matter of rule of law and political will1
Are the enforcement mechanisms in place to identify and respond to net neutrality violations viewed as effective?This question shows the extent to which net neutrality norms actually achieve their goals 1
Total (Mean of L-e und L-I sub-indicators)                  8.5

Media Ownership Monitor Serbia 2023 - Legal Assessment

Gender Imbalance in the Media Industry

Result: High Risk

This indicator assesses the representation of women in news media, focusing on relevant newsroom policies and the share of women in management positions.

Why?

Score: 2.75 = High Risk

MOM research showed that there is a great gender gap between men and women at managerial and leading positions in media companies. Less than 30% of women take ownership, founding or CEO/directors roles. This result is consistent with results of the research carried out by the Faculty of Political Sciences in 2021, stating that there is a “glass ceiling” for women working in media. This research also showed that the majority of the workforce in the media industry are women (60%), but only 18% of them take higher, managerial positions.

Research carried by Independent Journalists Association of Serbia (IJAS) in 2020 on online attacks on female journalists noted that attacks on women usually carry not only a political but also a gender dimension. 

LOW (1)MEDIUM (2)HIGH (3)
12.1Do the leading news media in your country have a policy aiming at a balanced representation of women in the newsroom?
Most leading news media have a gender equality policy or other kinds of self-regulatory measures to make sure that there is adequate representation of women in the newsrooms and in management positions. Moreover, there are mechanisms at place to make sure women in the newsroom don’t encounter harassment or discrimination.Some news media have a gender equality policy or other kinds of self-regulatory measures to make sure that there is adequate representation of women in the newsrooms and in management positions. In these news media, there are mechanisms at place to make sure women in the newsroom don’t encounter harassment or discrimination.There is no gender equality policy in the newsrooms assessed, or they are not effective, leading to discrimination and harassment of female journalists.
12.2Are women journalists subject to harassment or online/ offline violence in your country?
The working environment of women journalists is safe, harassment online or offline is not common, sufficient safeguards are in place.Both men and women are harassed to a similar extent, (physical) violence against female journalists is not common.Cases of violence are reported and harassment of women journalists is common in the country, with many known and reported cases. Women are considered to be more targeted by harassment and violence than men.
12.3

What is the share of women among owners of leading news media?

VALUE TV: 0/7 (0%)
VALUE Radio: 3/10 (30%)
VALUE Print: 1/16 (6.25%)
VALUE Online: 0/12 (0%)

Average of VALUES: 8.9%
40 percent or moreBetween 39 and 30 percentLess than 30 percent
12.4

What is the share of women among founders of news media?

VALUE TV: 0/10 (0%)
VALUE Radio: 1/9 (11%)
VALUE Print:  0/12 (0%)
VALUE Online: 1 out of 11 (9%)

Average of VALUES: 5%
40 percent or moreBetween 39 and 30 percentLess than 30 percent
12.5

What is the share of women amongst top managers of news media (such as editor-in-chief or CEO)?

VALUE TV: 2/10 ( 20%)
VALUE Radio: 1/9 (11%)
VALUE Print: 0/13 (0%)
VALUE Online: 1/11 (9%)

Average of VALUES: 10%
40 percent or moreBetween 39 and 30 percentLess than 30 percent
12.6

What is the share of women in key editorial positions in the newsroom (such as leading editors below the level of editor-in-chief or department heads at television stations)? 

VALUE TV: 1/10 (10%)
VALUE Radio: 2/9 (22%)
VALUE Print: 1/13 (8%)
VALUE Online: 1/11 (9%)

Average of VALUES: 12%
40 percent or moreBetween 39 and 30 percentLess than 30 percent
12.7

What is the share of women in key (board) positions in the newsroom (meaning non-editorial management positions, such as chief financial officer, head of sales and marketing, etc.)? 

Data not available

40 percent or moreBetween 39 and 30 percentLess than 30 percent

 

 

  • Project by
  •  
    Global Media Registry
  •  
    Funded by European Union